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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/ Appellee
Case No. 20070534-CA
v.
EDWARD ALLEN BUCK
Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-6-404 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake

County, the Honorable Terry L. Christiansen presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this
appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103 (2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, PRESERVATION
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's intent to steal a computer?
Standard of Review: "When a jury verdict is challenged on the ground that the
evidence is insufficient, . . . '[w]e review the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict[, and w]e reverse . . .
only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted.'" State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ^ 15,167 P.3d 503

(quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992)).1
2. Whether the court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for arrest of
judgment based on prosecutorial misconduct?
Standard ofReview: The appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to
arrest judgment based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion. State v.
Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264, \ 10, 167 P.3d 517.
STATUTES AND RULE
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 76-6-401, -402, -404 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant was charged with theft, a class A misdemeanor. Rl-2, 181-82. At the
close of evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the case for insufficient evidence. R287:162.
The trial court denied the motion. R287:163. A jury convicted defendant. R226. Defendant
moved to arrest the judgment, claiming prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient evidence.
R237-47. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. R286:l-14. The court sentenced
defendant to a jail term of 365 days, but suspended the sentence and placed defendant on

1

Since defendant relies on the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss at the close of
evidence, and not the court's denial of his claim of insufficient evidence on his motion to arrest
judgment for preservation of this claim, see Aplt. Br. at 2, the standard of review is that
applied to review of a jury's verdict. Cf. State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^f 41, 70 P.3d
111 ("When evaluating whether the State produced sufficient 'believable evidence' to
withstand a challenge at the close of the State's case in chief, we apply the same standard
used when reviewing a jury verdict.") (citation omitted).
2

probation for 12 months conditioned upon 75 hours of community service and a cognitive
restructuring class. R270-71. Defendant timely appealed. R274.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State's Case-in-Chief
Alan Myers met defendant in San Diego in early July 2003, when Myers was
commuting back and forth from Utah, doing contract work for a data processing company.
R287:80. They discussed a bitless bridle that defendant had designed. R287:50,79. Myers
was intrigued with the bridle and, after speaking with defendant on a couple of occasions,
suggested that defendant see him when he came to Salt Lake City. R287:51.
In late July, defendant and his girlfriend, Pat, arrived in Utah with "most of their stuff
in the car." R287:51, 81. Myers offered his basement to defendant and Pat until they all
figured out how to help the couple "back on their feet." Id. When no opportunities arose,
Myers suggested that he and defendant might start a website to sell the bridles. R287:51.
Myers built a website and several months later Myers and defendant formed a
partnership-Supreme Calvary-to sell the bridles. R287:51-52.
The partnership was a "50/50 agreement." R287:53. Myers was to contribute his
computer and website expertise, business relations and Internet contacts, and account credit.
Id. Defendant was to market the bridle, contact people, and sell the bridle. Id. All the
money put into the business-to maintain the website and pay for services-came from Myers'
computer business, Myers' personal account with Wells Fargo, to which defendant's name
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was added, and a business account in Myers' name, dba Supreme Calvary. R287:53, 56.
Defendant did not contribute any money, in spite of an agreement that each partner would
contribute $ 100 to the Wells Fargo bank account. R287:53-54. The partnership never owned
any assets. R287:56. Myers alone supported the business with his personal income and his
own computer business. Id. Any computers used in partnership belonged only to Myers, and
the computer defendant was later charged with stealing from Myers' home was never
partnership property. R287:56, 72. Myers paid for that computer, all of its hardware and
software components, including the programs and Internet access, and the monitor and
keyboard. R287:73-74.
In the summer of 2004, Myers recognized that the partnership was not selling bridles
and that he was seeing only a cash outflowfromhis personal resources and business account.
R287:54. He continued to work with defendant, but asked him to find a part-time job to pay
for his room and board and some of the business expense. Between August and October
2004, Myers sold only one bridle. Id. In late January 2005, after Myers insisted that
defendant help support himself, defendant got a job working as a live-in caretaker for Valerie
Brown. R287:54-55. Until then, defendant had lived rent-free in Myers' basement. R287:52,
54, 88-89. After securing the caretaker job, defendant deposited one paycheck into the
partnership's joint account. R287:55. Defendant, however, withdrew more moneyfromthe
account than he deposited. R287:75.
Defendant had sued a Dr. Cook, his former partner, over the patent on the bridle.
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R287:55. After defendant moved out of Myers' home, he would usually come by the home
two days a week and work from around 8:00 am to 1:00 pm on his lawsuit. R287: 55, 91.
Myers never denied defendant permission to enter his home after defendant moved out. Id.
At that time, the Supreme Calvary website and accounts were still operative, and Myers still
considered that he and defendant were in business together. R287:55, 89.
The computer defendant stole was purchased by Myers in 2002. R287:57. Myers and
his son rebuilt the computer several times because of virus problems. R287:57, 59, 63.
Typically, Myers would rebuild his computers' operating systems with XP, Microsoft XP or
Microsoft Office 2003 Professional and add Adobe Acrobat Professional. Id. He might also
add other development tools for web development. Id. Myers owned the licenses associated
with these programs. R287:57.
Myers owned at least six computers, including the one defendant stole, which were
all networked together. R287:58. Myers moved the computer in question into the family
room, where all of his family and he used it until it was stolen. It was the only computer
Myers allowed defendant to use. R287:60. When it was later examined by a governmental
agency, only data files belonging to defendant were found. R287:60-62; State's Exhibit 1.
Myers and his family vacationed from the 19th to the 28th of August 2005. R287:64.
Defendant had permission to enter the house to feed Myers' pets while he was away. Id.
Myers also gave defendant permission to use the computer, as he always had "to do his
lawsuit stuff." R287:64-65. However, Myers had never allowed defendant to take the
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computer from the house, and he did not give his permission to take it while he was away.
R287:65,71.
When Myers returned home on August 28, he found a letter from defendant, dated
August 23. R287:65, 70. Although Myers had helped defendant fix his car and given him
money and free room and board, defendant derided Myers' personal, spiritual, and financial
integrity, complaining that Myers was "dominating, manipulating, power hungry," claiming,
in the language of Biblical scripture, that Myers was spiritually deficient, and insisting that
Myers' had repeatedly failed to adequately support their partnership. R287:65-66; State's
Exhibit 3, pp. 1-2 (Addendum B). Defendant asked Myers to send him receipts and
photographs related to Spirit Bridle and to shut down Supreme Calvary and its website.
State's Exhibit 3, p. 2. Defendant further wrote that he took Myers computer because it had
all of his personal "stuff on it and that he would pay fair market value when he obtained
appropriate funds. R287:65; State's Exhibit 3, p. 2. The letter did not indicate either what
amount or when defendant would pay for the computer. R287:66. It was signed, "Rev.
Edward Allan Buck." State's Exhibit 3, p. 2.
Myers understood the letter to terminate defendant's business relationship with him.
R287:66. Although the letter had a Las Vegas return address, it did not have a telephone
number. R287:67; State's Exhibit 3, p. 1. Myers tried to reach defendant at the only phone
number in Las Vegas he had for him, without success. R287:66. He then called Valerie
Brown, and, based on his feeling that her response was "not right," decided to drive by her
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residence. R287;69-70. When Myers drove by Brown's residence the next day, he saw
defendant's car there. R287:70. Following the instructions of his insurance company to file
a police report, Myers called the sheriffs department. R287:69-71.
Deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff Tracy Boughn received Myers' complaint about the
stolen computer. R287:116-17. After talking with Myers, Deputy Boughn directed dispatch
to have an officer contact defendant. R287:l 17-18. When Deputy Boughn arrived at
Brown's residence, he found two officers talking with defendant outside the premises.
R287:119. Defendant did not appear to the deputy to understand why the police were there.
R287:126. Defendant said he was a business partner with Myers and allowed Deputy
Boughn to accompany him into Brown's house. R287:120-21. Inside, the deputy saw the
computer, monitor, and keyboard on a table. R287:121. Defendant acknowledged that he
had taken the computer equipment from Myers' residence. R287:122. While asserting
Myers had built the computer from him to use, he nevertheless acknowledged that the
computer was not his. R287:123. After reading a copy of defendant's letter to Myers,
Deputy Boughn told defendant that it did not appear to him that defendant had a right to take
the computer from Myers' residence. R287:124. As the stolen computer was loaded into the
police car, "[defendant] . . . stated that he had an ownership interest in the computer and
believed he was entitled to retain possession of [it]." R287:130.
The Defense
Defendant introduced himself as "Reverend Edward Allen Buck." R287:132. He
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described his relationship with Myers as "a cooperative business relationship and a
friendship." Id. Under the Supreme Cavalry agreement, defendant understood that he and
Myers would share profits 50/50, Myers would provide the financial support, and he would
provide the intellectual property, manufacture, and sales. Id.
Defendant described how the Spirit bitless bridle, which he claimed to have invented,
was different from a conventional bridle. R287:134. He believed that he could sell hundreds
of thousands of the bridles, because it was the most humane way to work with horses.
R287:135. His former partner, Dr. Robert Cook, had been the chief veterinary officer at
Spirit Horse Limited, a predecessor company to Supreme Calvary, but defendant claimed that
Dr. Cook left the company, stole defendant's original 1988 design, and patented it.
R287:135-136. Defendant admitted that he had received a settlement from one of his
lawsuits against Dr. Cook, which was based on defendant's 1988 design of the bridle.
R287:155-56. Nevertheless, in 2003 he, pro se, sued Dr. Cook again, and the United States
Patent Office, for fraudulent procurement. R287:136,142,156-57. Myers agreed to provide
defendant with a computer to prosecute the lawsuit, for which Myers would receive ten
percent of damages if the lawsuit was successful. R287:136-37.
Defendant never saw anyone else use the computer that Myers assembled for him, nor
did he find on the computer any files that belonged to anyone else. R287:142-43.
In answer to whether he took the computer believing that he had an ownership interest
in it, defendant answered: "My understanding was that [Myers] had made the computer, put
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the computer together because it was not together when we got there. He built the computer
for me and gave it to me and said that this is your computer and I assumed because we had
an agreement with the lawsuit and then [sic] subsequent agreement with the Spirit Supreme
Calvary that it was part of a partnership, a working agreement." R287:143-44. He was
"astonished" when police officers came to his home. R287:144. He did not believe he had
committed a crime. Id. He wrote the letter to Myers because, in discovering that his name
was not associated with Supreme Calvary, a company "that was totally about me and my
product and my method" he had been deprived of his "intellectual [] and physical []" property,
and so decided that he had no partnership. R287:145-46.
In answer to the question about why he would have to remunerate Myers for the
computer if it had been given to him or the partnership, defendant answered, "Because even
though he'd stolen from me, I wouldn't steal from him." R287:146. He believed that
because the computer belonged to the partnership he was entitled to it. R287:149
Defendant acknowledged that he did not put any money into the partnership; that he
did not pay Myers any money for the computer, that he never mentioned a price for the
computer in his letter; that he did not supply a telephone number where he could be reached,
give Myers a date by which he would pay him for the computer, or consult with him about
taking the computer; and that he took the computer when Myers was gone because he was
upset after Myers' refused to fund defendant's trip to Kentucky to school the only white
thoroughbred in the country in dressage with the bridle. R287:145, 153-54; State's Exhibit
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3,p.2.
At the close of evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the State
had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not have an honest belief
that he had a right to obtain or exercise control over the property or that if the owner had
been present the owner would have consented to his control over the property. R287:162.
The trial court denied the motion. R287:163
The jury convicted defendant of theft, as charged. R287: 195-96;226.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Court should not consider defendant's claim of insufficient evidence under the
reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model because it is simply inapplicable to this case. The
Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when the jury is correctly instructed that it
may convict a defendant only upon finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no
need to provide the jury with a reasonable-alternative-hypothesis instruction.

Here,

defendant never claimed below and does not claim on appeal that the reasonable doubt
instruction given to the jury was deficient.
Further, the reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model is inapplicable on its terms. The
sufficiency of evidence may be weighed under that model when the evidence is purely
circumstantial. Here, there was direct evidence that the computer belonged only to Myers,
that it was never part of partnership property, that defendant knew he was not permitted to
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remove the computer from Myers' home, that defendant took the computer because he was
upset with Myers, and that he communicated in writing that he did not intend to return it.
Further, the trial court gave an instruction that fully reflected the only hypothesis of
innocence defendant pursued at trial. The jury was instructed that if the State was unable to
disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with an honest belief, it must find
him not guilty. In fact, defendant invited any error. He confirmed that he had no exception
to the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction, and then stipulated to a jury instruction that
charged the State to disprove his defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft and to rebut
that defendant had an honest belief that he was entitled to take the computer or that Myers
would have consented to his taking it. There was evidence that defendant took the computer
because he was upset with Myers' efforts in promoting the partnership, that he took it
surreptitiously, that he had no intention of returning it, and that he could not have honestly
believed that he was entitled to it as a partner, given his negligible contribution to the
partnership.
POINT II
The prosecutor's remarks during final closing argument were not improper. Contrary
to defendant's argument, remarks that Myers and not defendant owned certain software and
the licenses to that software were undisputedly established by the evidence. Myers testified
that he had paid for all of the software components and programs on the computer, that he
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also owned the licenses associated with the software, and that he typically would rebuild his
computers' operating systems with XP, Microsoft XP or Microsoft Office 2003 Professional
and add Adobe Acrobat Professional. Defendant did not object to this testimony. Any claim
that the evidence failed to establish what precise operating systems were on a computer that
was indisputably operable is trivial. Similarly, any claim that the evidence failed to establish
that defendant was unaware that computer software licenses universally demand that the
owner not transfer the software is unpersuasive. Finally, it is not clear, as defendant claims,
that the prosecutor asked the jury to infer that, given defendant's likely understanding that
the licenses precluded Myers from giving the software away, defendant thereby could not
have had an honest belief that he had a right to the computer. Rather, the prosecutor's
concluding remark might equally have meant just what he said: "So, just 'cause you used it
and needed it, that's not a sufficient basis to have an honest belief." Thus, the prosecutor's
remarks were, at most, questionable.
Even if the prosecutors remarks were improper, defendant was not prejudiced.
Contrary to defendant's claim, evidence of defendant guilt for theft was strong.
Additionally, defendant's failure to timely object to the prosecutor's remarks
aggravated any prejudice stemming from those remarks.

Defendant did not claim

prosecutorial misconduct until he filed his motion to arrest judgment, thirty-three days after
trial. He only raised the precise argument urged on appeal, and then only casually, at the
hearing on his motion, more than one month later. Thus, defendant deprived the trial court
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of a timely opportunity to strike any objectionable argument or to give a specific curative
instruction and thereby mitigate any prejudice stemming from the remarks to which he now
complains. Nevertheless, the jury was not without guidance concerning the remarks. The
trial court instructed the jury concerning the nature of evidence, that lawyers merely present
it, and that "[w]hat lawyers say is not evidence." In light of the strength of the State's case,
defendant's actions that limited the trial court's ability to mitigate any prejudice, and
instructions that properly guided the jury's processing of argument, any misconduct was
harmless.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT
STOLE MYERS5 COMPUTER
Defendant claims the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence. Aplt. Br. at 24. He argues that the State presented only circumstantial evidence
"that [he] took the computer with the specific intent to commit theft rather than with an
honest belief ['that he had an ownership interest in it or that Myers, if present, would not
have objected to his taking it.']" Aplt. Br. at 30-31. Consequently, he argues, the State was
required to prove that the evidence "'preclude[d] every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.'"
Aplt. Br. at 24-28 (quoting State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782,786 (Utah App. 1998), affd, 1999
UT 79, 985 P.2d 911. He suggests under that test "it is possible that the marshaling
requirement does not apply to circumstantial evidence cases." Aplt. Br. at 28. Nevertheless,
13

defendant does, albeit incompletely, undertake that requirement, finally arguing that under
the reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model the evidence was insufficient to show that he
lacked an honest belief. Aplt. Br. at 28-34.
The Court should decline to review this case under the reasonable-alternativehypothesis model because it is unnecessary under the facts of this case: The Utah Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that review under that model is unnecessary where the jury is
correctly instructed on reasonable doubt; this is not a case of exclusively circumstantial
evidence; an instruction was given that fully expressed the only hypothesis on innocence
defendant pursued; and, defendant both failed to preserve his present claim and/or invited
any error. Therefore, the Court should review defendant's claim of insufficient evidence only
under its usual sufficiency standard. Here, evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant took the computer with the specific intent to commit theft
and that he lacked an honest belief that he had an ownership interest in the computer or that
Myers, if present, would not have objected to his taking it.
A. The reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model is not
required to determine the sufficiency of evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when the jury is correctly
instructed on the requirement that it may convict a defendant only upon finding him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no need to provide the jury with a reasonable-alternativehypothesis instruction. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 n.l (Utah 1992) ( "With
regard to the 'no reasonable alternative hypothesis' theory upon which defendant proceeds,
14

we note that this court has previously indicated that this is only one way of stating the
prosecution's burden of proof, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt/9) (citing
State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980)); State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1312
(Utah 1986) (affirming its rule that [a reasonable alternative hypothesis] instruction is
unnecessary "'where the jury is instructed that the State must prove a defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt'") (quoting State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985));
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255,257,470 P.2d 246,247 (1970) ("[If'from all of the facts and
circumstances shown' the jurors] are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt, it necessarily follows that they regarded the evidence as excluding every other
reasonable hypothesis."); Layman, 1999 UT 79,fflf2, 10 (holding that the court of appeals'
application of the reasonable alternative hypothesis doctrine was "problematic and
unnecessary" and asserting that the case "should have been decided by applying an ordinary
sufficiency of the evidence test").
Here, defendant does not claim that the reasonable doubt instruction given to the jury
was deficient. Thus, the Court should not apply the reasonable-alternative hypothesis model
in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence.
Further, the reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model does not apply because this is
not a case of exclusively circumstantial evidence, as defendant insists. Aplt. Br. at 25-30.
"Where the only evidence presented against the defendant is circumstantial, the
evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."
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State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221,222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion) (citing State v. Romero, 554
P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976)). However, this rule "is not controlling when only part of the
evidence is circumstantial." State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976) (citation
omitted).
Circumstantial evidence, is [e]vidence based on inference and not on personal
knowledge or observation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (8th ed. 2004). Direct evidence,
on the other hand, is "e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that,
if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption." Id. at 596.
Here, evidence disproving that defendant acted with an honest belief, the sole
contested issue at trial, was not exclusively circumstantial, but also consisted of direct
evidence: Myers testified that any computers used in partnership belonged only to him and
that the computer defendant later took from his home was never partnership property
(R287:56,72); Myers also testified that he had never allowed defendant to take the computer
from the house, and he did not give his permission to take it while he was away (R287:65,
71); defendant wrote a letter in which he told Myers that he had taken the computer (State's
Exhibit 3); and, defendant was found in possession of the computer and admitted that he had
taken it from Myers' home (R287:121-22). Most importantly, the tone of defendant's letter
clearly suggested defendant took the computer, not because he had an honest belief that he
was entitled to it, but because he believed that Myers had failed to uphold his commitment
to the partnership. See State's Exhibit 3. Defendant confirmed that sentiment on the stand
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when, in answer to the question about why he would have to remunerate Myers for the
computer if it had been given to him or the partnership, he answered, "Because even though
he'd stolen from me, I wouldn't steal from him." R287:146. In sum, because there was
direct evidence concerning defendant's lack of honest belief, the reasonable-alternativehypothesis model should not be applied in this case.
Furthermore, the narrow command that circumstantial evidence must "preclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence," Layman, 953 P.2d at 786, has been recognized by this
Court to overstate the reasonable doubt requirement. In State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah
App. 1998), the Court stated, "'[t]he existence of one or more alternate reasonable
hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the jury from concluding that defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at 281 (quoting State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688,695 (Utah
App. 1995)). "' [W]e must simply insur[e] that there is sufficient evidence as to each element
of the charge to enable the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
committed the crime.'" Id. at 282 (quoting Blubaugh, id). "[I]t is then within the province
of the jury to judge the credibility of the testimony, assign weight to the evidence, and reject
these alternate hypotheses.'" Id. (quoting Blubaugh, id.).
Moreover, defendant fails to acknowledge that he stipulated to a jury instruction
which fully reflected the only hypothesis of innocence he pursued at trial, which tracked
almost verbatim the honest belief defense provided by UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-402 (West
2004):
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You are instructed that it is a complete defense to a charge of theft that a person:
(A) acted under an honest claim of right to the property involved; or
(B) acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise
control over the property as he did; or
(C) obtained or exercised control over the property honestly believing that
the owner, if present, would have consented.
R183, 192; Instruction #33, R220 (Addendum C). The instruction fiirther stated that
defendant had only to put on some evidence which tended to show that defendant acted with
such honest belief, in which case "then the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Buck did not act with such an honest belief or honest claim of
right." Id. The instruction finally stated: "If after consideration of all evidence in the case,
you are left with a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Buck acted with kind of honest belief
or honest claim of right to the property, then you must find him 'not guilty.'" Id. In short,
Instruction #33 effectively instructed the jury that the evidence "preclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence" under the traditional proof-beyond-reasonable-doubt requirement.
And to the extent defendant now implies that the jury was not fully instructed on his
reasonable-alternative-hypothesis model, defendant invited any error by stipulating to
Instruction 33. Defendant never argued in his motion to dismiss or to the jury that the
question of his guilt or innocence should have been tested under the reasonable-alternativehypothesis model, nor did he request an instruction beyond Instruction #33. See State v.
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ 9, 86 P.3d 742 ("'[A] party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.'") (citation
omitted).
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B. The standard of review.
"In making the determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to uphold a
conviction, an appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder." State v. Merila, 966 P.2d
270, 272 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991), quoting
State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146,1150 (Utah 1991)). "It is the exclusive function of the jury
to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Lamm, 606
P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)). It is not the function of a reviewing court "to determine guilt
or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the
weight to be given defendant's testimony." State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216,218 (Utah 1976)
(citations omitted). "The mere existence of conflicting evidence, therefore, does not warrant
reversal.'" Warden, 813 P.2d at 1150 (citations omitted). "'Rather, the function of a
reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is sufficient competent evidence regarding
each element of the charge to enable a jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant committed the crime.'" Id. (citations omitted). "Therefore, when reviewing a
claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may
be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict." Id. (citations
omitted). "It is only when the evidence, viewed in this light, is so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
that it is proper to overturn the conviction." Id. (citations omitted). "'So long as there is
some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite
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elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.'" State v. Boss, 2005 UT
App 520, \ 9, 127 P.3d 1236 (quoting State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 67, 27 P.3d 1115).
Though this is not a case of exclusively circumstantial evidence. However, even if
it was, the foregoing standard similarly applies.
C. Evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant did not honestly believe that he had an ownership interest in
the computer or that Myers, if present, would not have objected to his
taking it.
To prove defendant guilty of theft the State was required to prove that defendant took
the computer with the purpose to deprive Myers of it. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404
(West 2004). "'Purpose to deprive' means to have the conscious object to withhold property
permanently or for so extended a period or to use under circumstances that a substantial
portion of its economic value, or the use or benefit thereof would be lost.55 UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-6-401 (West 2004). The jury was instructed on these elements and definitions.
See Instruction #'s 29 and 34, R2165 221 (Addendum C).
The jury was also instructed as to defendant's theory of the defense: In taking the
computer, defendant acted under an honest claim of right, or that he had an honest belief that
he had a right to take the computer, or that he took the computer honestly believing that
Myers, if present, would have consented. See Instruction #33, R220 (Addendum C). The
jury was instructed that to prove defendant guilty of theft, the State was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted without such honest belief. Id.
Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove the only contested issue at trial, that
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defendant intended deprive Myers of the computer or, alternatively, that he did not have an
honest belief that he had the right to take the computer:
• All of the material resources of the partnership belonged to or were
contributed exclusively by Myers:
• All the money put into the business-to maintain the website and pay for
services-came from Myers' computer business and Myers' personal
and business accounts (R287:53, 56);
• Defendant did not contribute any money, including the $100 expected of
each partner, with the exception of the deposit of one paycheck
(R287:53-55);
• The partnership never owned any assets (R287:56);
• Myers alone supported the business with his personal income and his
own computer business (R287:56);
• Any computers used in partnership belonged only to Myers, and the
computer defendant iater took from Myers' home was never partnership
property (R287:56, 72);
• Myers paid for the computer, all of its hardware and software components,
including the programs and Internet access, and the monitor and
keyboard (R287:73-74);
• Defendant's sole material contribution to the partnership was the deposit of
a single paycheck; however, he withdrew more money than he deposited
(R287:55, 75);
• The partnership sold only a single bridle (R287:54);
• Myers assembled a computer for defendant to use (R287:58-63);
• All of Myers family and he used the computer, which was networked to
the other computers in the home (R287:58, 60);
• When Myers returned from a ten-day trip, the computer he gave defendant to
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use was gone (R287:66); he found a letter from defendant, in which:
• Defendant derided Myers' personal, spiritual, and financial integrity,
castigated him for his spiritual deficiencies, and rebuked him for
repeatedly failing to adequately support their partnership (R287:65-66,
State's Exhibit 3, pp. 1-2);
• Defendant informed Myers that he was taking the computer, and that he
would pay for the computer later; however, the letter stated
no date or amount for payment (State's Exhibit 3, p. 2);
• Defendant failed to give any information about how he could be
currently contacted (State's Exhibit 3, pp. 1-2);
• Myers had never allowed defendant to take the computer from his home, and he did
not give him his permission to take it while he was away (R287:65, 71);
• Myers only discovered defendant's whereabouts when he called defendant's
employer, receiving a response that felt "not right" (R287:69-70);
• Defendant admitted to the police that the computer was not his (R287:123);
• Defendant admitted that he took the computer when Myers was gone
because he was upset with Myers (R287:145,153-54; State's Exhibit 3, p.2).
This evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict. It supports in a
variety of ways that defendant took Myers' computer with a purpose to deprive him of it.
Defendant's taking the computer was motivated by a long-festering upset with Myers about
how their business venture should be conducted and his belief that Myers had repeatedly
failed to support it. His promise to pay for the computer rung hollow because it was silent
about when or how much he would pay. The jury could have inferred from defendant's
impecunious condition—he arrived at Myers' residence with a car full ofpersonal belongings
and lived in Myers basement rent-free for a year and half until asked to support himself—
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that he had no intention of paying. R287:52, 54-55, 81, 88-89. In fact, by taking the
computer and unilaterally asserting that he would later pay a price he determined to be
appropriate, defendant acknowledged that he had no intention of returning the computer.
Defendant provided no information about how he could be located. And defendant's letter,
in addition to his self-bestowed appellation, "Rev. Edward Allan Buck," trumpeted a smugly
righteous tone, from which the jury could have inferred that he stole the computer out of
anger and malice, and to purposely deprive Myers of it. See State's Exhibit 3, pp. 1-2.
The evidence equally supports that defendant stole the computer without an honest
belief that he had an interest that entitled him to take the computer or that Myers would have
consented if he had been present. Defendant stole the computer when Myers was away and
because he was upset with him, clearly undermining any honest belief that Myers would have
consented. The great weight of evidence also undercuts defendant's claim that the computer
was partnership property and that he honestly felt he was thereby entitled to it: Defendant
contributed almost nothing to the partnership, which was already an apparent failure not long
after it was initiated. Myers, on the other hand, contributed all of the funding to the
enterprise. Myers specifically stated that the computer was never partnership property and
was assembled only for defendant's use in Myers residence. Myers also never allowed
defendant to take the computer from his home, nor did he give defendant permission to take
it while he was away. Myers and his family used the computer, and it was networked to
Myers' other computers. When Myers tried to locate defendant, he got a "not right" feeling
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from defendant's employer. Defendant admitted to the police that the computer was not his.
This evidence undercuts any honest belief of entitlement. Defendant took the computer
surreptitiously, he contributed disproportionately little to the partnership, he had no
reasonable basis for believing that the computer was partnership property or that he could
take it from Myers home, he was apparently hiding out in his employer's home, and he
admitted to the police when arrested that the computer was not his. In sum, the evidence was
sufficient to prove that defendant acted with a purpose to deprive Myers of the computer and
that he did so without an honest belief.
Defendant nevertheless argues that his relationship with Myers evidenced a working
partnership that justified his honest belief in taking the computer. Aplt. Br. at 32-33.
Defendant relies on the fact that "Myers routinely exhibited a willingness to financially
support [him], that Myers "allowed [defendant] to live in his house rent-free," that he and
Myers had a joint bank, and that defendant believed that the computer was essential to the
partnership so that he could pursue his patent suit. Aplt. Br. at 32-33. Defendant also
characterizes the above facts set out by the State differently to show that he was acting with
an honest belief. Aplt. Br. at 31-34. He concludes by arguing that those facts are so far
"against the clear weight of the evidence," that this Court may act as a second fact-finder to
overturn the jury's verdict. Aplt. Br. at 35-40.
Defendant's arguments are unpersuasive. The jury weighed the evidence and found
defendant guilty as charged. See Warden, 813 P.2d at 1150 ("The mere existence of
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conflicting evidence... does not warrant reversal.'"). Moreover, defendant's arguments that
this court should act as a second fact-finder are contrary to well-established law. See Merila,
966 P.2d at 272 ("In making the determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
uphold a conviction, an appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder."). Defendant cites
no relevant authority for such an approach in a case in a jury trial in which the quantum of
evidence supporting the jury's verdict was so clearly sufficient.
POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS WERE, AT MOST,
QUESTIONABLE; IN ANY CASE, ANY MISCONDUCT WAS
HARMLESS GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF THE EVIDENCE,
DEFENDANT'S OWN FAILURE TO OBJECT OR REQUEST A
CURATIVE INSTRUCTION, AND THE PROVISION OF
INSTRUCTIONS PROPERLY GUIDING THE JURY'S REGARD OF
COUNSELS' ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that in final closing argument the prosecutor improperly referred to
matters not in evidence and prejudicially drew inferences as to defendant's guilty mind by
referring to those matters. Aplt. Br. at 15-23. Specifically, he argues that, without
evidentiary foundation, the prosecutor referred to specific software that was on the computer,
the limiting effect of licenses associated with the software which precluded the owner from
giving the software away, and defendant's awareness of the limiting effect of those licenses.
Aplt. Br. at 19. Defendant argues that the prosecutor relied on those unestablished facts to
infer that defendant could not have had an honest belief that the computer belonged to him
because he would have known that the licenses precluded Myers' from giving him the
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software loaded on the computer. Aplt. Br. at 20. The prosecutor's remarks, he claims, were
prejudicial because not only was the State's case not strong, but also the timing of the
prosecutor's argument precluded him from objecting or the trial court's giving a curative
instruction. Aplt. Br. at 20-23.
The argument fails because the prosecutor's remarks constituted fair argument from
the evidence or were, at most, questionable. In any case, any alleged misconduct was
harmless given the strength of the State's evidence and defendant's own failure to timely
object or request a curative instruction. Further, the trial court's preliminary instructions
provided the jury with sufficient guidance about how to regard argument of counsel.
A. Factual background.
On direct examination in the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor elicited from Myers
that he typically would rebuild his computers' operating systems with XP, Microsoft XP or
Microsoft Office 2003 Professional and add Adobe Acrobat Professional. R287:57. He
might also add other tools for web development. Id, The prosecutor also elicited that Myers
owned the licenses associated with these programs. Defendant did not object to Myers'
testimony. Id.
In final closing argument, the prosecutor began by disputing the defense theory that
the computer defendant stole was an asset of the partnership. R287:185. Apart from the
website Myers created and the bridle, he argued, the partnership had no assets. Id. at 185-86.
Accordingly, the prosecutor continued, the computer was not an asset of the partnership.
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Rather, along with Myers' family, defendant was merely permitted to use the computer. Id,
at 186. Then the prosecutor reviewed the circumstances of defendant's taking the computer:
Defendant took it without permission when Myers was not home, leaving a letter with only
a Las Vegas address and without any telephone number, and asserting that he had used and
needed the computer. Id, at 186-87.
The prosecutor then stated:
Who did the operating system belong to? Who owned the licenses of those
items? Those were owned by Mr. Myers. Mr. Myers didn't have the ability
to give them up even if (inaudible). They were operating systems on there,
Windows Microsoft Word, Acrobat Adobe, again these are things you can't
just give away. All the components were (inaudible). So, just 'cause you used
it and needed it, that's not a sufficient basis to have an honest belief.
Id. at 187. Defendant did not object to these remarks. Id,
The prosecutor further argued that although defendant told the police that Myers had
made the computer for him, he nevertheless admitted that the computer did not belong to
him. Id. And although defendant claimed an interest in the computer, the prosecutor stated
that Myers "owned that property." Id.
The prosecutor then responded to an analogy posed by defendant in his argument and
challenged defendant's claim of honest belief. Id. at 188-89. He argued that the only way
a person in defendant's position could have had an honest belief that he was permitted to take
the computer was if he had Myers' agreement. Id, at 189-90. But, he concluded, defendant
did not have such an agreement. Id. at 190.
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The prosecutor's final closing argument comprises 116 lines of transcript. The
challenged remarks comprise just over six lines. R287:185-190.
Thirty-three days after the jury found him guilty of theft, but before
sentencingdefendant filed a motion to arrest judgment alleging prosecutorial misconduct and
insufficient evidence. R23 5. As to prosecutorial misconduct, defendant argued only that the
prosecutor improperly urged to jury to convict him of also having stolen computer software,
which defendant claimed was an offense for which he had not been charged and to which he
was unable to respond because it was delivered in the prosecutor's final closing argument.
R242-44. At the hearing on the motion one month later, defendant argued the same theory.
R286:8-12. Only in concluding did he briefly assert, for the first time, that the prosecutor
improperly argued that defendant knew the software could not be given to him. R286:12.
The trial court denied the motion:
I listened to the evidence in this case. I listened to closing arguments.
I do not find that there was any error made. Certainly if there was, I'd find it
to be harmless. This case was heard before a jury. The jury reached a verdict
and I'm not going to grant the motion to arrest judgment.
R286:14.
B. The standard of review.
'"Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when the prosecutor's comments call the jurors'
attention to matters not proper for their consideration and when the comments have a
reasonable likelihood ofprejudicing the jury by significantly influencing its verdict.' " State
v. Redding, 2007 UT App 350, \ 26,172 P.3d 319 (quoting State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, \ 18,
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8 P.3d 1025). "In undertaking this evaluation, we are mindful that '[a] criminal conviction
is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone."5
State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, f 31,173 P.3d 170 (quoting United States v. Diaz-Carreon,
915 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir.1990)). "Rather, '[i]mproper prosecutorial comments require
reversal only if [they] substantially affected the defendant's right to a fair trial.'" Id. (quoting
Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d at 956). See also State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984)
(same). "Furthermore,' [fjor an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome
must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" Id. (quoting State v.
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987)).
"'In determining whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the
statement must be viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial.'" Todd,
2007 UT App 349, f 14 (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 1992))
(additional citations omitted). "'Further, because the trial court is in the best position to
determine the impact of a statement upon the proceedings, its rulings on whether the
prosecutor's conduct merits a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
C. The prosecutor's remarks were, at most, questionable.
" 'In summing up a case before a jury, counsel may not introduce or comment on facts
outside the evidence, but reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence and
considerable latitude is allowed in discussing it. Counsel may appeal to the jury with all the
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power and persuasiveness his learning, skill and experience enable him to use.' " State v.
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 51, 55 P.3d 1131, cert denied, 63 P.3d 104 (2003) (citation
omitted).
In final closing argument, the prosecutor asked two rhetorical questions, which he
answered himself, and made two assertions of fact, all to this effect: Myers, not defendant,
owned the Windows Microsoft Word and Acrobat Adobe operating systems on the computer,
and the licenses to that software forbade Myers from giving the operating systems away.
R287:187.
That statement was substantially established by the evidence. Myers testified he had
paid for all of the software components and programs on the computer. R287:73-74.
Typically, he would rebuild his computers' operating systems with XP, Microsoft XP or
Microsoft Office 2003 Professional and add Adobe Acrobat Professional. R287:57. Myers
also owned the licenses associated with these programs. Id. Defendant did not object to any
of this testimony.
For thefirsttime on appeal, defendant asserts that during the presentation of evidence
the State "did not establish what software was on the computer," apparently focusing on
Myers' testimony that he "typical[ly]," rather than in this specific case, rebuilt his computers
with certain operating systems. Aplt. Br. at 19. This claim of misconduct is trivial. No
evidence is necessary to support an assertion that a personal computer will not operate
without some type of operating system, and it undisputed that the computer defendant stole
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was operable, regardless of the specific operating system that Myers installed.
Similarly, evidence is hardly necessary to show that all computer software is
purchased with licensing agreements that uniformly demand that the purchaser agree not to
transfer the software to a third party. And to the extent that such evidence is necessary, the
omission is trivial. Moreover, the prosecutor's concluding remark—"So, just 'cause
[defendant] used [the computer] and needed it, that's not a sufficient basis to have an honest
belief[,]" see R287:187—does not clearly identify the improper inference defendant ascribes
to it. Defendant claims that the prosecutor's concluding remark implied that defendant could
not have had an honest belief that the computer belonged to him because he would have
known that the software licenses precluded Myers' from giving him the software-loaded
computer. But the statement also supports a different conclusion: Defendant's need and use
of the computer could not give rise to an honest belief that he was entitled to take it. This
interpretation is fully supported by the record.
Modest recharacterization of the evidence does not necessarily "call the jurors'
attention to matters not proper for their consideration." Redding, 2007 UT App 350, \ 26.
In State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, 174 P.3d 628, Ross was convicted of aggravated murder and
attempted aggravated murder after he entered the home of his ex-girlfriend and shot her to
death and then chased and fired at the victim's boyfriend. Id. at TfTf 1-3. The principal issue
at trial was whether Ross was guilty of murder or aggravated murder, where it was arguable
whether "the homicide was incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal
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episode . . . during which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the
victim who was killed." Id. at 113 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (l)(b) (West 2004)).
In closing argument, the prosecutor "seized a sizeable portion of latitude" when (1) he
implied that Ross had ordered both the victim and her boyfriend into the bedroom where he
killed the victim, even though the evidence showed that Ross had only pushed the victim
toward the bedroom; and (2) he asserted that the boyfriend had testified that "very few
seconds" elapsed between the time Ross killed the victim and when he approached the
boyfriend and began shooting at him, even though the boyfriend gave no specific time frame
for the sequence of events. Id. at \ 56. Even though the prosecutor's recharacterization of
the facts bore "on the main issue in the case"—whether the "the homicide was incident to
one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode"—the Utah Supreme Court held the
prosecutor's remarks to only be "questionable" Id. at 57.
Here, the only "fact" the prosecutor may have improperly implied is that defendant
was aware of a restrictive license provision, a fact not established by the evidence. Given
that such awareness can likely be attributed to almost all computer users, the prosecutor's
assumption was hardly egregious and less "questionable" than the prosecutor's
misstatements in Ross.
D. Alternatively, defendant was not prejudiced.
"The prejudice prong of prosecutorial misconduct analysis requires consideration of
the circumstances of the case as a whole." Todd, 2007 UT App 349, ^f 33. "In making such
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a consideration, it is appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt." Id. " 'If proof
of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed
prejudicial.' " Id. (quoting Troy, 688 P.2d at 486)." 'Likewise, in a case with less compelling
proof, this Court will more closely scrutinize the conduct.' " Id. (quoting Troy, id.) " 'If the
conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence
susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be
improperly influenced through remarks of counsel.' " Id. (quoting Troy, id.)2
1. Evidence that defendant stole the computer was strong.

2

Defendant claims that if prosecutorial misconduct is established, then the State
can overcome the error only by establishing harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.
Aolt. Br. at 19. Defendant accuratelv cites dicta in to. 2007 IJT 89. f 54 for thte
proposition. Nevertheless, the State respectfully suggests that the dicta articulating the
Utah Supreme Court's expression of that standard was misapplied to the claim of
prosecutorial misconduct in Ross, and that that standard does not apply in this case.
The harmless-error-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies only to successful
claims of constitutional error. See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^f 45, 55 P.3d 573
("Where the error results in the deprivation of a constitutional right, we apply a higher
standard of scrutiny, reversing the conviction unless we find the error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.") (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). The court in
Ross considered a claim of prosecutorial misconduct which did not involve a
constitutional right. Id. at \ 56. The court, nevertheless, cited State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d
1114, 1116 (Utah 1977), which applied the harmless-error-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard in a case involving a claim of prosecutorial misconduct infringing on the
constitutional right to silence. Eaton, at 1116 (citing Chapman). In this case, there is no
claim that the prosecutor's alleged improper remarks infringed any constitutional right.
Thus, if the prosecutor's remarks are determined to be improper, the correct standard for
the State's overcoming that error is simple harmlessness.
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Contrary to defendant's claim, evidence of guilt was strong. Myers owned the
computer that defendant stole, only allowed defendant to use the computer, never regarded
it as partnership property, and never permitted defendant to remove it from his house. It was
undisputed that defendant took the computer without Myers' permission while Myers was
away from his home because he was upset with him, that defendant left no current contact
information, that defendant did not indicate when or how much he would pay for the
computer, and that defendant wrote simply that he was taking the computer. See Aple. Br.
at Pt.IC.
2. By failing to timely object to the prosecutor's alleged improper remarks,
defendant was directly responsible for aggravating any claimed prejudicial
effect the prosecutor's remarks might have had on the jury.

This Court has recognized "two additional factors relevant to the determination of
whether a defendant has been prejudiced by improper statements." Todd, 2007 UT App 349,
If 34 (citing with approval State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1224-25 (Utah 1993)). "The first
factor is whether defense counsel addressed the improper statements during closing argument
and the prosecution then 'restricted his surrebuttal comments to the evidence and made no
further mention of the improper comments." Id. (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. "The
second factor is whether the trial court gave a curative instruction admonishing the jury to
'dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence" and instructing them "not to consider the
statements of counsel as evidence.' "Id. (quoting Dunn, id)
The first Dunn factor does not precisely apply to this case because the prosecutor
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made his alleged improper remarks in final, rather than in initial, closing argument.
Nevertheless, a defendant may still substantially mitigate any prejudice by objecting to
improper prosecutorial remarks, all to the same effect contemplated by the first Dunn factor.
Defendant complains that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks "[b]ecause
the State raised its improper argument for the first time during its closing rebuttal, [and, so,]
had no warning about it and no opportunity to defend himself against it." Aplt. Br. at 20. As
a consequence, defendant further argues, "the trial court offered no curative instruction to
ensure that the jury knew it should disregard the State's comment." Aplt. Br. at 20-21. That
claim does not fully and fairly represent the facts of this case or the law.
As set out above, the prosecutor elicited from Myers on direct examination all the
facts complained of in his final closing argument, except the possibility that defendant knew
of the restrictive nature of the licenses associated with the software. R287:57. Thus, it is an
overstatement that defendant "had no warning" about the prosecutor's argument.
More importantly, defendant implies that because the prosecutor made his remarks in
final closing argument, he was helpless to respond. Utah appellate courts have rejected that
position, recognizing that a defendant has a duty to object even if he is not in a position to
respond substantively. In State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973), the court rejected a
claim that the prosecutor had made prejudicially improper comments in rebuttal to the
defendant's closing arguments. Id. at 426. The court noted that "[djefendant failed to assert
an objection during the course of argument, and the trial court was deprived of the
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opportunity to determine the matter or caution the jury." Id. See also State v. Brown, 948
P.2d 337, 344-45 (Utah 1997) (refusing to consider under plain error alleged improper
remarks in closing rebuttal where counsel strategically chose not to object). State v. Palmer,
860 P.2d 339, 344-45 (Utah App. 1993) (observing in response to claim of numerous
instances ofprosecutorial misconduct, including comments made in final closing, "[w]hether
or not objections to such misstatements are to be made is trial counsel's decision," and that
"[i]In the vast majority of instances, failure to object to such a misstatement will be deemed
a waiver of the error") Numerous other jurisdictions have similarly recognized that defense
counsel should object in response to alleged improper prosecutorial comments in final
closing argument. See e.g., United States v. Vallie, 284 F.3d 917, 922 (8th Cir. 2002)
(refusing to hold prejudice established where "Vallie did not object to the challenged
statement during closing argument, request a curative instruction on it, or move for a
mistrial."); State v. Andrews, 726 A.2d 104,113 (Conn. 1999) (defense counsel's failure to
object to the prosecutor's argument when it was made suggests that defense counsel did not
believe that is was unfair in light of the record of the case at the time."); People v.
Krutsinger, 121 P.3d 318, 324 (Colo. App. 2005) ("[A] defendant's failure to object
suggests, that at least at the time the comment was made, 'the live argument was not overly
damaging.' ") (citation omitted).
Moreover, by not timely objecting to the prosecutor's remarks, a defendant may
deprive the trial court of an opportunity to strike any objectionable argument or to give a
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timely curative instruction and thereby mitigate any prejudice stemming from the remarks
to which he now complains. " '[CJurative instructions are a settled and necessary feature of
our judicial process and one of the most important tools by which a court may remedy errors
at trial.5 " See Todd, 2007 UT App 349, ^ 43 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271
(Utah 1998)). "Indeed," the Court continued,
[i]f a trial judge could not correct errors as they occur, few trials would be
successfully concluded. Moreover, our judicial system greatly relies upon the
juryfs integrity to uphold the jury oath, including its promise to follow all of the
judge's instructions.... [Virtually every jurisdiction, both state and federal,
relies upon such instructions in curing errors during trial and in reviewing
errors on appeal.
See id. (quoting Harmon, id.) (brackets in original). Todd did not object until the prosecutor
was entirely finished with her closing argument. Id. at ]f 44, 44 n.4 (postulating that the
delayed objection may even have been a "strategic maneuver") The Court stated: "Had
[defendant's counsel objected earlier, the curative instruction would have been more closely
linked in time to the improper statements. Therefore, the delay in [defendant's objection
directly caused the timing problem of which he now complains." Id. at Tf 44. The Court
further observed that "defense counsel's silence during closing argument allowed additional
improper statements to be made. Had [defendant's counsel objected as soon as he recognized
what the prosecutor was doing, the harmful remarks would have been greatly curtailed and,
presumably, more timely addressed." Id. at ^f 44 n.4.
Here, defendant did not object to the prosecutor's remarks at trial. Rather, he only
challenged those remarks in his motion to arrest judgment, thirty-three days after trial had
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concluded. R235. More than another month passed before he raised the claim of which he
now complains, and then only barely. R286:8-12. Thus, defendant deprived the trial court
of a timely opportunity to strike any objectionable argument or to give a specific curative
instruction and thereby mitigate any prejudice stemming from the remarks to which he now
complains.
Nevertheless, in spite of defendant's failure to timely object, the jury was not without
guidance regarding closing argument. The trial court instructed the jury that "[evidence] can
be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations that certain facts exist
(Instruction #7, R207; 287:29); "[i]t is the role of lawyers to present evidence" (Instruction
#3, R206; 287:27); "[w]hat lawyers say is not evidence" (Instruction #9, R208; 287:31); and
the jury's role was render a verdict "based only on the evidence produced here in court [and]
. . . based on facts, not on speculation." (Instruction #6; R207; 287:29). These instructions
were sufficient to cure any error. See Valdez, 513 P.2d 426 (impliedly holding that
instructions that admonished the jury to consider only properly admitted evidence and to
disregard counsels' arguments as to what evidence was unless correctly stated or shown in
evidence cured any prosecutorial misconduct).
In any case, the comments did not prejudice defendant's case. First, the prosecutor's
remarks were not clearly improper, but at most questionable. Moreover, evidence was strong
both that defendant intended to permanently deprive Myers of the computer and that
defendant could not reasonably have had an honest belief that he had a right to obtain or
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exercise control over the computer or that Myers would have consented to his taking the
computer. See Ross, 2007 UT 89 atffif57-58 (holding that "questionable" remarks harmless
in light of "strong" evidence of guilt); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 350 (noting as to multiple
instances of misconduct, including unsupported innuendo, examination on veracity of other
witnesses, argument on matters not in evidence and constitutional right to silence, that" any
one of these errors would in itself be harmless") Although defendant was not in a position
to respond substantively to the prosecutor's remarks, he either strategically chose not to
object or simply failed to object, thereby aggravating any prejudice that may have stemmed
from the prosecutor's remarks. And finally, the jury was told that the statements of counsel
were not evidence and, consequently, could not be the basis of conviction. In short, any
misconduct arising from the prosecutor's remarks was harmless.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State requests that the Court affirm
defendant's conviction.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. [0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18,
Tf 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982).
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument."
Utah R. App. P. 29(a)
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

Day of May 2008.

MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

/KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this^^Day of May 2008, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
LORI J. SEPPI
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CRIMINAL CODE

§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 1 . Definitions
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and
intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, written
instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights concerning real
or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value
to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or
any portion of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the owner thereof intends to be available only
to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, whether to
the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to secure performance
thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any facsimile, replica,
photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use
under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or
of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(ri
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that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily
limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by
trespassoiy taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact
that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to
affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect
the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe to be true;
or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a
lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the
enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, security interest, claim, or
impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter of official record; or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in
the transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not
sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise
would not be performed.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-401.

§ 76-6—402. Presumptions and defenses
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation
of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the
person in possession stole the property.
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor is
not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of this
subsection shall not include a security interest for the repayment of a debt or
obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service
involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise
control over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service honestly
believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-402; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 16.

§ 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 . Theft—Elements
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-404.
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Rev. Edward Allan Buck, "Spirit Horse"
6133 Rifle Crest Ave
Las Vegas, NV 89156

LISTEN TO SPIRIT
NOT MAN

August 23,2005

Mr. Allen Myers
2346 E. Charros Road
Sandy, Utah 84092

Allen,
It is with a heavy heart and a clear conscious that I leave you behind me and my Spirit Bridle. I
highly appreciate the opportunity of filing the law suit against Cook; however, everything else
heavily out weighs that bit of usefulness in my life.
Luke Chapter 10 verse 10 & 11 say this, 10 "But whatever city you enter and they do not receive you,
go out into its streets and say", 11 "Even the dust of your city which clings to our feet, we wipe off
against you, yet be sure of this that the kingdom of God has come near."
The kingdom of Heaven is around you but you do not have eyes to see or ears to hear and your mouth
stays not silent in humility.
This is the hardest letter I have ever had to write, but your actions and lack of actions have forced me
to act for my health and welfare. You made a commitment to supposedly be a business partner,
however, your commitment has been not to sacrifice and really commit to the business but rather it
has been to do as little as possible and expect the most in return. In trying to do business with others,
you want everything cut rate and the heck with the fact that someone else needs to earn a living from
what they provide and this turns people against you and what you have to offer.
I have loved as a brother and you have treated me as a cash cow, providing me with as little as
possible to exist while expecting a gigantic return. You have lost me and a great future that will
materialize shortly. The reason is simple; you lack the integrity and humility to be truly spiritual.
You use your free will nature to be an emotional and physical bully to others and if anything is said
against you, you either try and throw it back on those speaking or blame the "Adversary". The only
place to rest the blame is with you.. .not with outside sources, it is your free will. Your attitude you
present to everyone is simply that you can do everything better than everyone else and you have done
it all...no matter what someone says you can out do them. You belittle people with your
condescending attitude. You are a control freak...'... a dominating, manipulating, power hungry
individual.

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT
| EXHIBIT NO.
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August 23, 2005
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To date you have done as little as possible to advance Spirit Bridle. To date you have not changed
the web site as I requested July 23, 2005. Instead you demand of me that I use the email account you
set up instead of what I choose. Once again you bully. The web site is not in our names it is in your
name and the bank account has your wife's name on it, to wit I did not give you permission to do
that. The straw that stuck me in the foot and makes me do what Christ said to do, is the fact that you
chose to ignore the opportunity of a lifetime for me and Spirit Bridle and thus the business. You
knew I requested a roundtrip airfare to Kentucky and your wife knew the reason and yet you do not
have the integrity to call me or see me before you take off on a vacation in Oregon.
I lost my stallion, which was the poster horse for Spirit Bridle {he went to the killers}; because you
choose not to help and yet I saw you spend thousands of dollars elsewhere. You did not care
whether I lost all my stuff in storage and yet I saw you spend money elsewhere. You always hated to
give me money for gas or want to do any repairs to my truck, yet I saw you spend money elsewhere.
You have whined about the cost of printer paper and cartridges, which basically is the only thing I
asked from you after I stopped asking for anything for my truck.
The kicker is this Allen, you whine at me that you have no money and your credit cards are maxed
out, yet you spend money for things other than your commitment to the business; and I am not talking
about living expenses.
Allen, you do not know how to sacrifice and commit from the heart, which is the Spirit Within, nor to
sacrifice and commit to others physically, emotionally or spiritually and that is sad. You always have
strings attached, ways that it must profit you in some manner.
Remember it was you who screamed at me that I am not spiritual, I am not humble, that God does not
talk to me and that only you can interpret the Scriptures properly! I carry that with me always and
yet I have still tried so hard to help you and your family. What would President Hinckley, the rest of
the Members of the Presidency, and the members of your ward think of you if they knew that those
are the words you spit into peoples faces.
Please send copies of all receipts you have regarding expenditures related to Spirit Bridle.
Please immediately shut down the Utah business known as Supreme Cavalry.
Please immediately shut down the web site known as www.supreme-cavalrv.com
Please immediately send the photographs that you failed to place upon the website.
I have the computer as it has only my stuff on it and I need it and I left the wireless unit... I will pay
you for the computer at fair market value when I have the appropriate funds.
I wish you all the blessings that Creator can heap upon you. I wish you the blessing of hearing your
Spirit Within and thus learning to communicate with those around you. I wish the blessing of
finding true tranquility in this life that comes from hearing the Spirit.
Rev. Edward Allan Buck
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LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN, Bar No. 9218
Deputy District Attorney
8080 South Redwood Road, SI 100
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Telephone: (801) 233-9900
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

STIPULATED
INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE JURY

Plaintiff,

vs.
1

EDWARD ALLEN BUCK,

Case No. 051400781

Defendant.
JUDGE TERRY L. CHRISTIANSEN
Lohra Miller, District Attorney for Salt Lake County, and Christopher G. Bown, Deputy
District Attorney, hereby request that the attached jury instructions be included in the instructions
to be given the jury impaneled in the above-entitled matter.

Dated this _5

day of

, 2007.

LOHRA MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County

Christopher G. Bown
Deputy District Attorney

Attorney for Defendant
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INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that it is a complete defense to a charge of theft that a person:
(A) acted under an honest claim of right to the property involved; or
(B) acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the
property as he did; or
(C) obtained or exercised control over the property honestly believing that the owner, if
present, would have consented.
The law does do not require a defendant to prove that he acted under this kind of honest
belief or honest claim of right. What a defendant must do, if the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not already tend to show it, is to bring forward some evidence which tends to
show that he acted with this honest belief or honest claim of right to the property. If such
evidence has been presented, then the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Buck did not act with such an honest belief or honest claim of right.
If, after consideration of all evidence in this case, you are left with a reasonable doubt as
to whether Mr. Buck acted with this kind of honest belief or honest claim of right to the property,
then you must find him cnot guilty.'

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Case No. 051400781

vs.
Judge Terry L. Christiansen
EDWARD ALLEN BUCK
Defendant.
Ladies and Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one through twenty-seven, given to you
at the beginning of the trial. There are also attached instruction 27 through

included at a later time in the

proceedings. Taken together, these instructions govern your conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case
and must be carefully followed.
Dated this 4th da^ of A^ril 2007
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13.

WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY?
If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant to
the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining testimony from
that witness unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event you should give
what weight you think it deserves.

14.

QUESTIONS BY JURORS DURING THE TRIAL
A jury member may direct questions to the judge or to a witness. Write the question as it
arises and hand it to the bailiff who will hand it to me. I will share the same with the
lawyers who have the right to express an opinion as to whether it is proper. If the
question is not one that is allowed under the rules of evidence or is otherwise improper, I
will tell you. Otherwise, the question will generally be allowed.
I remind you that the lawyers are trained in asking questions that will produce the
evidence necessary to decide this case. However, if you feel there is something important
that has been missed or that needs clarification, you may ask a question by complying
with the procedure outlined in this instruction.

The prosecution has the burden of proof. It is the one making the accusations in this case.
The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by assuming it.
According to our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a humane provision of the law intended to guard
against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished.
16.

HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY?
Before you can give up your presumption the defendant is innocent, you must be
convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

17.

WHAT IS REASONABLE DOUBT?
Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only
necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the
prosecution's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the
defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute
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certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every
possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced
that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find the defendant guilty. If on
the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that defendant is not guilty, you must
give defendant the benefit of the doubt and find defendant not guilty.
[EVIDENCE IS PRESENTED BY COUNSEL]
18.

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE
The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages which
contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this case. These
additional instructions begin with instruction number twenty-seven (27). We will read
those after completing our review of the following instructions which relate essentially to
the procedure that you should follow.

19.

WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM
You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss
this case:

20.

a.

all exhibits admitted in evidence;

b.

your notes (if any);

c.

your copy of these instructions; and

d.

the verdict form or forms.

WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM
The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in charge. This
person is called the "Foreperson" or the "Chair". The Chair's duties are:
a.

To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak;

b.

to represent the jury in any communications you make; and

c.
to sign your verdict and bring it back in court.
In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The Chair has no more power
than any other juror.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

^

You are instructed that it is a complete defense to a charge of theft that a person:
(A) acted under an honest claim of right to the property involved; or
(B) acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise control over the
property as he did; or
(C) obtained or exercised control over the property honestly believing that the owner, if
present, would have consented.
The law does do not require a defendant to prove that he acted under this kind of honest
belief or honest claim of right. What a defendant must do, if the evidence presented by the
prosecution does not already tend to show it, is to bring forward some evidence which tends to
show that he acted with this honest belief or honest claim of right to the property. If such
evidence has been presented, then the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Buck did not act with such an honest belief or honest claim of right.
If, after consideration of all evidence in this case, you are left with a reasonable doubt as
to whether Mr. Buck acted with this kind of honest belief or honest claim of right to the property,
then you must find him 'not guilty.'

nrsn^^f)

INSTRUCTION NO. 3 4
Before you can convict the defendant, Edward Allen Buck, of the offense of Theft, as
charged in count 1 of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about August 23, 2005, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the

defendant, Edward Allen Buck, intentionally or knowingly obtained or exercised control over the
property of another; and
f 2^

That the defendant obtained or exercised control over such property with a

purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and
3.

That the value of the property is or exceeds $300.00 but is less than a $1000.00.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor as charged in count 1 of the
information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one
or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count 1.
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